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THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE
CHRONIC CHALLENGE OF COST CONTROL
By: Isaac D. Buck†
Thank you, Derek, and thank you all for having me. First of all,
I would like to congratulate the Journal on a wonderful symposium
topic this year, a theme that is uniquely newsworthy. Nonetheless,
considering this is the focus of much of my waking hours, scholarship,
and teaching, I may be biased. But I thank you for bringing together
stellar voices to have this conversation and for providing a platform
for such a vital topic.
In my talk, I’d like to move beyond focusing solely on the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), or even specific health insurance
reforms, and widen the analysis. Instead of speaking on the
constitutional law implications of litigation surrounding the ACA, I’ll
be focusing on one of the most daunting health policy challenges
facing the American health care system in 2017. Nonetheless
recognizing that the symposium is organized around the impact of
NFIB v. Sebelius,1 I’ll be sure to wrap the case into later comments.
But in my estimation, the debates of the day, that focus both on the
recently abandoned American Health Care Act (“AHCA”) and the
battered and embattled ACA, avoid a necessary holistic discussion of
the American health care system. In some ways, the reform debate has
been co-opted: instead of talking about existential challenges within
American health care, the extended health reform debate has focused
instead on the ACA’s so-called “government takeover.”
This debate has replayed for seven years; it has been focused
on the effectiveness of websites, on the increasing amounts of
premiums in the individual marketplace without a corresponding
discussion of the extensive subsidies that support them, and the debate
regarding, of course, whether Obamacare and the ACA are in fact the
same thing. Following the collapse of the AHCA effort, national media
†
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characterized it as a political failure of the Trump administration while
noting that Obamacare—without specifying what specific part—was
still tenuous.
But these debates and narratives obscure the entirety of what
the ACA does. Sure, individual markets have struggled, including my
home market of Knoxville, Tennessee, but characterizing the entire
law as “failing” is not only misleading, it’s untrue. This is the law that
established the rights of 26-year-olds to stay on their parents’ plans,
that outlawed preexisting condition discrimination, that provided
funding for evidence-based medicine and fraud and abuse
enforcement, that sought to increase reimbursement efficiencies in
Medicare, and provided free preventive and contraceptive care to
millions of previously-uninsured Americans.
I grant that the ACA is complicated and nuanced and some
pieces have not been as successful as anticipated, but by focusing on
the political fights over websites, we have allowed some of the ACA’s
strongest attributes regarding cost control to flounder. As a result, we
have left millions of Americans unaware of the good that the ACA is
doing, and has done, in their lives largely until recently. And in this
environment, it is impossible to have productive policy debates
focused on America’s big problems. Nonetheless, it is true that the
failure of the ACA to “break through” and provide clear tangible
positives in citizens’ lives, of which they are keenly aware, could
constitute a real critique of the messaging of the law. Health care
delivery and finance has no shortage of complexity.
Which brings us to the AHCA, a plan which, in the end, had
few supporters. Indeed, the AHCA focused its energy on shrinking and
fundamentally altering two things: the individual marketplace and
Medicaid. The debates focused on whether 23 million Americans—
who have been insured under the ACA—should be kicked off their
health insurance plans by 2026,2 whether Medicaid should be
fundamentally remade to incorporate work requirements and cease
being an entitlement program for many of the nation’s poor, and
whether health care reform as a policy matter could work without an
individual mandate. As you may have guessed, I thought these reforms
under the AHCA were misguided and doomed to fail, and indeed, they
did in the end, last week.
2
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From a policy perspective, an individual market without a
mandate would produce sicker, more expensive insurance pools.
Medicaid without secure funding would result in deep cuts in coverage
and access, essentially changing a program that has become a lifeline
for many (including children and the elderly), and capping the tax
subsidies given to those who cannot afford insurance would result in
fewer people signing up for coverage, more expensive premiums, and
a growing number of uninsured individuals showing up in the nation’s
emergency rooms.
As the New York Times stated, the AHCA was a “bill in search
of a problem” and that it reflected “no shared vision” of what it wanted
to achieve.3 Its reforms were likely to worsen health coverage, access,
and outcomes. Perhaps it was the newest attempt at delivering a death
blow to Medicaid, which covers more than 70 million Americans and
pays for nearly half the births in this country every year.4 But it, like
so many other health reform efforts before it, never made it into law,
nor even to the upper chamber of Capitol Hill. Given the omnipresence
of these debates, we can talk about arguments over the reforms and the
potential threats they create, but for the remainder of my talk, I want
to speak more specifically about America’s existential challenge: the
challenge of the cost of health care in the United States in 2017.
First, by larger, I don’t mean more consequential, particularly
for the millions of Americans who were at risk of losing insurance
under the AHCA or other repeal efforts. Instead, I mean a cost
challenge that is so daunting that it will likely inhibit the success of
any health care reform effort in the United States in the near future.
Indeed, it has hamstrung the ACA as well; this is because the pricing
and utilization challenges in the U.S. swamp the ability of health
reform efforts, like the ACA and AHCA, to achieve real cost control.
If one could imagine the cost challenge as a chronic condition, after
sustaining a number of body blows, the ACA treats the symptoms of
the condition while only limitedly impacting the overall cost of health
care. Nonetheless, the AHCA would have exacerbated them, but in
order for an American health care reform effort to find political
purchase, I submit that the underlying cost challenge must be directly
3
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and forcefully addressed. Besides being complex, what makes the cost
challenge so daunting is that there is seemingly little political will to
directly address it.
Over just the last two years, stories of the prices of Mylan’s
EpiPen5 and Martin Shkreli’s Daraprim6 hit the national news and
sparked outrage. Americans, even those with insurance, still too often
face surprising health care bills after coming home from a hospital
stay. Employers face increasingly difficult decisions about coverage
for their employees. Insurance companies are losing leverage in the
marketplace. But none of these stories and pressures have resulted in
congressional action in Washington on the price of health care.
Instead, the rising prices of health care have been blamed on
the ACA. As a result, the larger debate then centers on the specific
policy prescriptions of the ACA or its replacement and not on the
fundamental problem: that American health care is simply too
expensive. No amount of tax subsidy or increased access is going to
address that problem. If Americans really are serious about health care
reform, they need to stop ignoring the elephant in the room, to
paraphrase David Wolman in the context of drug pricing, that “prices
are too damn high.”7 And where the ACA sought to make inroads in
cost control, political hostility has wounded it.
So now, on to the numbers. Americans spend about 18 percent
of our gross domestic product (“GDP”) on health care, totaling well
over three trillion dollars each year.8 We spend the most per capita on
health care of any country in the world by a large margin, far outpacing
our peers in the United Kingdom and Australia, which both spend just
under 10 percent of their GDPs, respectively.9 Expressed in per capita

5
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http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/oct/us-health-care-from-aglobal-perspective.
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terms, we spend about $9,000 per year per capita on health care10
whereas Switzerland spends about $6,800,11 Germany about $5,100,12
and Australia less than half, at $4,200.13
This is not a new challenge, but America’s expenditure crisis
has intensified in recent years. As recently as 1980, America spent just
8 percent of its GDP on health care.14 This number rose in the 1990s
and 2000s.15 It is a crisis that has sharply intensified over the last 35
years. Health care expenditures are now increasingly eating into other
goods and services Americans can purchase and fund, like education,
defense, and travel. Of course, one could ask, “what else would you
want to spend 18 percent of your GDP on?” But it would indeed be a
different question if our elevated budget bought better health care for
our citizens.
Unfortunately, this lofty budget does not translate into
increased quality. Compared to its peers, America still lags behind on
a number of key quality metrics. According to recent data from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”), the United States is above average on infant mortality.16
And America is 27th out of 43 OECD countries on life expectancy.17
Further, another survey, completed by the Commonwealth Fund, ranks
the health systems of eleven countries.18 A survey published in 2014
by the Fund noted that the U.S. health system “underperforms relative
to other countries on most dimensions of performance,” and the survey
had America ranked last on its quality metrics,19 just as it did in 2010,
2007, 2006, and 2004.20 Recent studies have also concluded that
America has few practicing physicians and doctor consultations per

See Per Capita Healthcare Costs – International Comparison, Peter G. Peterson Foundation
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0006_health-care-oecd.
11
See id.
12
See id.
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See id.
14
See Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States & Selected OECD Countries, THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.kff.org/health-costs/issuebrief/snapshots-health-care-spending-in-the-united-states-selected-oecd-countries/.
15
See id.
16
See OECD Family Database: CO1.1: Infant mortality, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., (Aug. 27, 2006), https://www.oecd.org/els/family/CO_1_1_Infant_mortality.pdf.
17
See Life Expectancy at Birth, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (2015),
https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-birth.htm#indicator-chart.
18
See Karen Davis, et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, 2014 Update: How the U.S. Health Care
System Compares Internationally, The COMMW. FUND (June 16, 2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirror-mirror.
19
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capita compared to the OECD average,21 and, of course, without
adequate numbers of physicians, particularly in primary care, the
underlying problem intensifies.
There are two contributors to the expenditure challenge facing
American health care: utilization and pricing. The utilization problem
is due to America’s providers administering too much health care, and
the pricing challenge is due to the excessive costs of America’s health
care services, drugs, and equipment. In short, in the United States,
American providers perform too many surgeries, administer too many
tests, and intervene too frequently—and much of what providers do is
too expensive.
On the first point, American health care is dogged by
overutilization, of which I have written before, or overtreatment, to
which it is frequently referred. In trying to explain why the American
health care system administers too many health care services, one
could examine numerous causes: perhaps it is reimbursement
incentives, malpractice litigation or defensive medicine, demanding
patients, fragmented health care delivery systems and medical siloization, or expensive technological advancement. Personally, I think
all probably play a role.
Historically, America has been unable, first, to adequately
pressure physicians to care about cost efficiency and, even more than
that, has inexplicably built a reimbursement structure through
Medicare, at least historically, that has incentivized overtreatment.
Over 50 plus years, when providers have performed additional tests
and arguably unnecessary surgeries, they have earned more in
Medicare’s fee-for-service reimbursement regime. Further, providers
have been pressured to perform additional screens on patients who
may have complicated presentation due to a fear of malpractice
litigation and because the patient may be demanding it, and, honestly,
because practicing medicine is intensely difficult, and when providers
are faced with a patient who presents complicated problems, they may
want to double-check. Uncertainty causes anxiety, and anxiety seeks a
definitive answer to a complicated medical problem.
Paraphrasing author Shannon Brownlee, a provider seeking a
definitive answer is likely to rely on additional screening machinery,
especially if the patient wants it, and especially when the provider’s
time is tight.21 Additionally, American health care is persistently
21

See Anderson & Squires, supra note 8.
See Shannon Brownlee, Why Your Doctor Has No Time To See You, NEWSWEEK (April 16,
2012), http://www.newsweek.com/why-your-doctor-has-no-time-see-you-63949.
21
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fragmented and siloed. Providers are financially incentivized to
specialize further and further because the specialties that require
additional training and work often are the most financially lucrative.
American patients often see a number of providers without having
adequate primary care—the country faces a shortfall numbering
somewhere between 46,000 and 90,000 physicians by 2025.22 As a
result, care is often duplicated and wasted, and inefficiencies permeate
the system.
Finally,
somewhat
counterintuitively,
technological
advancement leads to overtreatment as well. Hospitals that have
recently acquired expensive top-of-the-line machinery feel compelled
to use it to pay for it. The more they acquire, the more they have to
use. And this is borne out by the numbers in the surveys that I
mentioned before. America does well at screening for cervical cancer,
for instance, but terrible in treating childhood asthma, reflecting great
screening capabilities, which is highly expensive, but poor primary and
preventive care, which is largely inexpensive.
In addition to the overtreatment challenge which largely drives
excess costs in government insurance program of Medicare, American
health care is hamstrung by astronomical costs because the prices of
health care in the United States—that is, the initial prices of drugs,
services, and hospital stays—are more expensive in this country than
anywhere else in the world. Reporting by the New York Times
particularly recent work by Elizabeth Rosenthal, has shined a light on
this problem.23
According to Rosenthal, the average colonoscopy in the U.S.
costs $1,200; it is priced at $600 in Switzerland.24 The average hip
replacement in the U.S. is over $40,000, and in Spain, it is $8,000.25
The cost of a prescription of Lipitor is $120.26 In New Zealand, it is

22

See The Complexities of Physician Supply and Demand: Projections from 2013 to 2025, ASS’N

OF AMER. MEDICAL COLLEGES, at 42 (Mar. 2015),
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23
See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Paying Till It Hurts, N.Y. TIMES (2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/health/paying-till-it-hurts.html (interactive site with
multiple articles).
24
See Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Million Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-us-leads-the-world-inhealth-expenditures.html?pagewanted=all.
25
See id.
26
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$6.27 An American angiogram costs $900; in Canada, it costs $35.28
An MRI in America is $1,100 on average and in the Netherlands, it is
about $300.29 In addition to the international differences, prices
between and among hospitals, even some in the same region or
community, vary wildly, seemingly without any regard for quality or
for service.
Even more inexplicably, the opaque pricing structure within
American health care actually often leads hospitals to charge those
without insurance more, at least initially, as they do not have the
benefit of the insurance company’s discounts. There are a number of
examples of perverse pricing within Medicare’s reimbursement
structure. For instance, in a recent paper, I discussed pricing
differences between the two drugs of Avastin and Lucentis,30 both
drugs that treat age-related Macular Degeneration (“AMD”). Millions
of Americans are affected by AMD each year and, as a result, of
course, many of them are elderly Americans; as a result, Medicare
covers both drugs without limitation.
Interestingly, both drugs of Lucentis and Avastin are
manufactured by the same company, Genentech, and after numerous
studies, both have been found to be basically clinically equivalent in
their effectiveness against AMD.31 Seemingly, the only clinical
difference is that one of the drugs is Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) approved for AMD treatment, and the other one is used in an
off-label manner, but is commonly used to treat AMD.32
The only other difference, of course, is the prices of the drugs.
Avastin is $50 per dose,33 and Lucentis is $2,000 per dose.34 After

27

See Rosenthal, supra note 24.
See id.
29
See id.
30
See Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the Standard
of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101 (2017).
31
See Marilyn Haddrill, Lucentis Vs. Avastin: A Macular Degeneration Treatment Controversy,
(Dec. 2016), http://www.allaboutvision.com/conditions/lucentis-vs-avastin.htm.
32
See id.
33
See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, An effective eye drug is available for $50. But many
doctors choose a $2,000 alternative, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/an-effective-eye-drug-is-available-for-50but-many-doctors-choose-a-2000-alternative/2013/12/07/1a96628e-55e7-11e3-8304caf30787c0a9_story.html.
34
See id.; Andrew Lam, Why do Doctors Choose a $2,000 Cure When a $50 One is Just as
Good?, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 10 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/10/why-do-doctors-choose-a-2000cure-when-a-50-one-is-just-as-good.
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discounts, Medicare pays about $26 for Avastin,35 and about $1,900
for Lucentis.36 This is an unfortunate enough development, of course,
but Medicare makes it worse. Under Medicare’s Part B reimbursement
scheme—because the drugs are administered in doctor’s offices—
Medicare pays ophthalmologists the average sales price (ASP) of the
drug plus 6 percent.37 It is known as “ASP plus six.” As a result,
doctors who rely on Avastin can make about $3 on the administration
of the drug, whereas doctors who rely on Lucentis can make about
$120, which is 6 percent of $2,000.38
A CMS effort to change this reimbursement mechanism in the
waning days of the Obama administration was recently abandoned.22
Instead, this enduring reimbursement scheme not only financially
incentivizes doctors to rely on the most expensive drug for treatment
of their patients, which is why it is no small miracle that 56 percent of
all ophthalmologists choose the cheaper Avastin to treat AMD,39 but it
indirectly incentivizes drug companies to price their drugs even higher
than they otherwise would.
Finally, in health care, the power of the consumer is nearly
nonexistent. Patients do not reliably act like consumers and operate at
a pervasive information gulf. As Carl Schneider and Mark Hall have
noted, patients are boundedly rational in every aspect of a clinical
scenario.23 On top of this, they are often in pain or frightened. On top
of these challenges, typical consumer-protection mechanisms are
simply inapplicable in the health care context: in no other industry
could a consumer expect to not know the price of the goods she
purchases before paying for the services.
Thus, American health care system then is both uniquely
expensive and generally mediocre, and although the debates over
access and insurance status dominate headlines today, insufficient dayto-day attention has been paid to universal cost and quality problems.
35

Emily Parker, OIG: Avastin A Better Buy For Wet AMD, MEDPAGE TODAY (April 25, 2012),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/practicemanagement/reimbursement/32359.
36
Whoriskey and Keating, supra note 33.
37
See Andrew Pollack, Genentech Offers Secret Rebates for Eye Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/business/04eye.html.
38
See id.
22
Virgil Dickson, Mandatory Participation Killed the Part B Demo, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec.
16, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161216/ NEWS/161219925.
39
Whoriskey and Keating, supra note 33.
23
See Carl E. Schneider and Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health
Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2009); Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Patients as
Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643
(2008).
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But that is not to say that reforms in this area have not been attempted
and have succeeded. One need look no further than March 23, 2010.40
By striving for universal coverage, the ACA tried to begin to address
these challenges: examples I will focus on here are cost-shifting and
negotiating leverage.
First, the ACA attempted to address cost-shifting, which is a
driver of excessive pricing. Cost-shifting stands for the reality that
hospitals will charge those with insurance more to cover the costs for
those who come to the emergency room without insurance and who
cannot pay. Under the ACA, if all individuals are covered by insurance
(even if the insurance is Medicaid that typically has relatively low
comparative reimbursement rates for hospitals and providers), then
hospitals would not have as powerful an incentive to cost-shift than
they do when a substantial percentage of the population is uninsured.
If the ACA succeeded in extending coverage universally then,
theoretically, the cost-shifting impetus would have been removed or
sated, and prices of health care—the prices of hospital services, for
instance—could have theoretically dropped or at least stabilized.
Second, the ACA sought to address the negotiating leverage
problem. One of the challenges of American health care is its
fragmented delivery system. By forcing millions of Americans into an
individual marketplace through the individual mandate, the ACA was
broadening its risk pools and deepening its coverage, which gives
insurance companies more leverage in negotiating with hospitals
because the company represents a larger network of beneficiaries. For
example, if insurance companies represent a substantial chunk of the
market in a given state, then the insurance company may have more
leverage in its negotiations over prices with hospitals. Hospitals must
be willing to deal, and, theoretically, the discounts steepen.
The negotiation over prices that insurance companies pay often
boils down to who has more leverage, the hospital or the insurance
company. When more potential patients are represented by the
insurance company, then it often has more leverage. Adversely, when
the hospital consolidates market power, prices rise. This is borne out
by numerous studies—including a study published late last year by the
Health Care Pricing Project, which found that hospital prices in
monopoly markets were 15 percent higher than those in markets with
40

Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010),
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four or more hospitals.41 Given what we know about monopolies and
pricing, that finding should not be surprising.
Further, when hospitals merge, prices increase. And America’s
health care industry is rapidly consolidating. According to Deloitte in
2014, “if horizontal consolidation continues in the coming decade, …
likely only 50 percent of [2014’s] unique health systems are expected
to remain.”42 Of course the consolidation of the marketplace has made
the pricing problem worse.
And this is where NFIB v. Sebelius—the U.S. Supreme Court’s
ruling that the individual mandate was a tax and thus permissible, but
that the Medicaid expansion was unduly coercive, and had to be
voluntary—becomes important.43 In the decision, Chief Justice
Roberts both saved the ACA, but wounded its operation—particularly
as it relates to cost control—by allowing states to opt out of Medicaid
expansion. In this opinion, the court not only limited its operation of
the ACA, but it destroyed one of the ACA’s intended tools to control
the cost of health care: its effort to address cost-shifting. Following
the Supreme Court’s decision, and with more people uninsured in
states that did not expand their Medicaid program, the cost-shifting
problem continued, unabated. This was exacerbated by the proposal to
cut other funding to hospitals, including, like Professor Huberfeld
mentioned, disproportionate share payments, although some of the
cuts have been delayed.
Nonetheless, in many rural parts of the country, the NFIB
decision has hastened the downfall of hospitals facing tremendous
budgetary shortfalls, putting in place a future of decreasing federal
subsidies and limited insurance coverage in states that do not expand
Medicaid. Particularly in my former home state of Georgia, eight rural
hospitals have closed since 2010.44 As a result, the solution to the costshifting problem was blunted in these states. From a global cost
perspective, this is the ultimate result of the Medicaid decision in
NFIB. And politically, the Affordable Care Act has suffered because
of rising premiums and an unsteady individual marketplace.
Zach Cooper, et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the
Privately Insured, HEALTH CARE PRICING PROJECT (Dec. 2015), at 3.
42
Ion Skillrud, et al., The Great Consolidation: The Potential for Rapid Consolidation of Health
Systems, Deloitte Center for Health Solutions (2014), at 9,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/ Deloitte/us/Documents/life-sciences-health-care/us-lshcgreat-consolidation-111214.pdf.
43
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 566.
44
Ariel Hart, Eighth Rural Hospital to Close Since 2010, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.myajc.com/news/eighth-rural-hospital-close-since2010/YBjgX2BKeIhwNMSsMarIwJ/.
41
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But again, had parts of the law been implemented as intended,
perhaps these marketplaces would have been more functional. As an
example, an important part of the ACA was known as the risk corridor
adjustment program whereby the Department Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) from 2014 through 2016 would spread the risk
among insurers who participated in the marketplaces at the end of each
year.45 This was seen as a safety net for insurance companies, in the
event they took on patients that ended up being riskier than the pool
average and more expensive than anticipated.
Nonetheless, Congress blocked HHS from making these risk
corridor adjustment payments and ultimately permanently stripped
them from HHS discretion. As a result, for instance, HHS paid slightly
more than 12 percent of promised risk corridor payments in 2014.46
And health insurance companies have sued for the payments. Moda
Health scored a big win in February of 2017 in the court of federal
claims, alleging that it was due payments under the risk corridor
program.47 These moves by a hostile Congress, in addition to the
continued unprecedented consolidation of health care markets—
perhaps even hastened by the ACA—have intensified the cost problem
and impacted patients.
But the ACA has sought to address the rising cost of health care
on other fronts. The law pushed hospitals to form Accountable Care
Organizations,48 which are new entities where providers and entities
share financial risk and are incentivized to achieve cost savings within
their systems. It also has sought to arm patients with more consumer
information. Further, by covering preventative care, the ACA seeks to
avoid the down-the-line expensive consequences that currently face
too many uninsured Americans. To quote law professor James Kwak,
this is “significantly better than nothing.”49 As Kwak argues in his blog
piece, The Problem with Obamacare, the ACA relies on a model that
utilizes private markets to expand coverage and on broad market-based
solutions like increased cost-sharing through raised deductibles to
45
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deter overuse and risk adjustment provisions to keep insurance
companies participating.50 But as he ultimately says, “Obamacare is a
heroic attempt to make the best out of this basic conundrum: we are
trying to use markets to distribute something that, at the end of the day,
we don’t want distributed according to market forces.”51
And due to political hostility, the NFIB case, the widespread
confusion over what the law does, and the complexity over the subject
itself, the ACA’s attempt to incorporate market-based solutions—
along with its reliance on the private insurance industry to participate
in the markets—leaves it unable to adequately address America’s cost
control problem, and as a larger result, politically vulnerable. It is a
step in the right direction, but only a step.
Fragmentation, overtreatment, and excessive pricing continue
in the American enterprise. As a result, monthly premiums will rise,
not just for those newly insured in the exchanges but those Medicare
beneficiaries who pay premiums, and those covered by their employers
as well. Serious health care reform efforts must address these bedrock
cost concerns. Without adequate attention to, and focus on, the cost of
health care, efforts that merely try to insulate further Americans from
feeling the pain of the cost of health care will be increasingly
ineffective.
Until American voters and legislators come up with bold new
ideas to fix fragmentation that continues to dog the markets, to engage
in robust antitrust efforts, to better address consolidation, and to
institute price ceilings, or all-payer rate setting laws, or public options,
or single payer plans, to hold down the price of the rising prices of
insurance, until this happens, prices in American health care will
continue to rise. And without concerted intervention, even with other
reforms—whether under President Trump or his successor or
successors—these cost pressures will continue to threaten the nation’s
leaders’ political success, how the reforms are perceived by the public,
and the quality and sustainability of American health care well into the
future.

50
51

Id.
Id.

